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Economics 451: Behavioral and Experimental Economics
 
University of Montana
 
Department of Economics
 
Fall 2018 
Instructor: Matt Taylor Email: matthew.taylor@mso.umt.edu 
Office: Liberal Arts 406 Office Hours: T 15:30-16:30 & W 10:15-11:45 
CRN: 74547 Lecture: T & R 14:00-15:20 
Lecture Location: JRH 205 
Tuesdays in FA 210, 9/4-10/23/2018 
Course Description: The purpose of this course is to provide you with an overview of 
experimental economics and behavioral economics. We will discuss the methods and the 
tools frequently used in economics experiments, as well as some of the key concepts, results, 
and contributions of experimental economics, behavioral economics, and neuroeconomics. 
We will explore the experimental design of previous experiments, and you will learn how to 
critically assess other experiments as well as design your own. 
Prerequisites: ECNS 201S: Principles of Microeconomics. 
Books: 
•	 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness 
Course Website: Moodle 
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Grading Policy: Your final course grade will be determined as follows:
 
20% Two Article Quasi-Referee Reports 
40% Research Proposal: 
Annotated Bibliography—5% 
Research Question & Motivation Presentation—5% 
Research Question & Motivation Document —5% 
Literature Review—10% 
Proposal—15 % 
5% Participation
 
5% Completion of CITI Human Subjects Protection Course
 
15% Midterm Exam (Thursday, 10/04/18)
 
15% Final Exam (Tuesday, 12/11/18 at 3:20 pm)
 
Due Dates 
• Referee Reports: 1st report due by 09/13/2018; 2nd due by 09/27/2018 
• Annotated Bibliography—09/20/2018 
• Research Question & Motivation Presentation—10/09/2018 
• Research Question & Motivation Submission—10/25/2018 
• Completion of Human Subjects Protection Course—10/18/2018 
• Proposal Literature Review—11/08/2018 
• Research Proposal—11/29/2018 
Graduate-level credit: Students taking this course for graduate-level credit will be re­
quired to present their research proposal in class during the last two weeks of the semester. 
The presentation will be worth 10% of the grade. The midterm weight will be reduced to 
5% for these students. 
Exams: Do not take this class if you know that you cannot make one of the 
scheduled exams. In the case of a missed midterm due to emergency situations, the stu­
dent may be allowed to complete a make-up exam provided I am notified as soon as possible 
and verification of the emergency is provided to me by phone or email, no later than 24 
hours after an exam. 
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Students with Disabilities: If you are a student with a disability who will require reason­
able program modifications in this course, please meet with Disability Services for Students 
in Lommasson 154 for assistance in developing a plan to address program modifications. If 
you are already working with Disability Services arrange to meet with me during my office 
hours to discuss reasonable modifications that may be necessary. For more information, visit 
the Disability Services website at http://www.umt.edu/disability. 
Drops and Credit/No-Credit: The University has deadlines and policies applicable to 
dropping the course and changing your grading option. Request to make changes must be in 
accordance with University policy and deadlines. In accordance with University policy, 
students taking the course credit/no credit must earn a D- or better to receive 
credit. 
Academic Integrity: All students must practice academic honesty. Academic misconduct 
is subject to an academic penalty by the course instructor and/or a disciplinary sanction by 
the University. All students need to be familiar with the Student Conduct Code. The Code 
is available for review online at http://life.umt.edu/vpsa/student conduct.php. 
Outline of Course Material: The following is a tentative schedule of lectures and as­
sociated readings. Additional readings (and potentially topics) will be assigned 
throughout the course. The schedule should be viewed as tentative and may be 
subject to change throughout the term. 
Part I: Introduction 
•	 Why do Experiments? 
–	 ∗Falk and Heckman, “Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the 
Social Sciences,” Science, 2009 
–	 ∗Levitt & List, “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences 
Reveal about the Real World?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007 
–	 Smith, “Economics in the Laboratory” 
•	 Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research 
•	 Tools 
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– Vecon Lab @ http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu
 
•	 Market Experiments 
–	 Pit Market 
–	 Double-Auction 
•	 Experiment: Vecon Lab, Double Auction 
Part II: Coordination, Bargaining, and Trust 
•	 Competition, Coordination, and Guessing (The Beauty Contest) 
–	 Holt and Roth, “The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective”, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science of the U.S., 2004 
–	 Van Huyck et al., “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordina­
tion Failure,” American Economic Review, 1989 
–	 Goeree & Holt, “An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination,” Games and Eco­
nomic Behavior, 2005. 
–	 ∗Nagel, “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,” The American 
Economic Review, 1995 
–	 Experiment: Vecon Lab, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Coordination, and Beauty Contest 
•	 The Dictator Game 
•	 The Ultimatum Game 
–	 ∗Camerer & Thaler, “Anomalies: Dictators, Ultimatums, and Manners,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 1995. 
–	 Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, “On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ulti­
matum Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 1996. 
–	 Kagel, Chung & Moser, “Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Informa­
tion and Asymmetric Payoffs,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1996 
–	 Camerer & Fehr, “When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social Behavior?”,” Sci­
ence, 2006 
–	 Experiment: Vecon Lab, Ultimatum Game 
•	 Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games 
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–	 ∗Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,” Games and 
Economic Behavior, 1995 
–	 Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl, “Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experi­
mental Investigation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993 
– ∗Cox, “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2004 
–	 Charness, Frechette, & Kagel, “How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?,” Ex­
perimental Economics, 2004 
–	 Experiment: Vecon Lab, Gift Exchange, Trust Game, Principal-Agent Game 
•	 Randomized Strategies 
–	 Experiment: Vecon Lab, Matching Pennies and Battle of the Sexes 
Part III: Choice under Uncertainty—Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory 
•	 ∗Holt and Laury, “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects,” The American Economic Review, 
2002 
•	 ∗Rabin & Thaler, “Anomalies: Risk Aversion,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
2001 
•	 Andreoni & Sprenger, “Time Preferences are Not Risk Preferences,” The American Eco­
nomic Review, 2012 
•	 ∗Barberis,“Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013 
•	 ∗Kahneman & Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econo­
metrica, 1979 
•	 ∗Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, “The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes in Choice 
and Pricing Task,” The Economic Journal, 2009 
•	 ∗Grossman & Eckel, ‘Loving the Long Shot: Risk Taking with Skewed Lotteries,” Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty, 2015 
•	 Experiment: Vecon Lab, Lottery Games 
Part IV: Behavioral Economics 
•	 Humans v. Econs 
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–	 ∗Nudge, p. 1-39 
•	 What is Behavioral Economics? 
– ∗Camerer and Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present and Future, 2002, 
p. 1-36. 
– ∗Chetty, “Behavioral Economics and Public Policy,” AER, 2015 
– ∗Benartzi & Thaler, “Behavioral Economics and the Retirement Savings Crisis,” 
Science, 2013 
•	 Preferences Revealed, Constructed, Discovered, or Learned? 
–	 ∗Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, “Coherent Arbitrariness,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 2003 
– ∗Ariely, Loewenstein, Prelec, “Tom Sawyer and the Construction of Value,” Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2006. 
•	 Heuristics and Biases 
–	 ∗Tversky & Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Sci­
ence, 1974 
•	 The Affect of Emotions on Economic Decisions 
–	 Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, & Welch, “Risk as Feeling,” Psychological Bulletin, 
2001. 
– ∗Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, “Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryover Effects 
of Emotions on Economic Decisions,” Psychological Science, 2004. 
–	 ∗Gambetti & Giusberti, “The Effect of Anger and Anxiety Traits on Investment 
Decision,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 2012. 
•	 The Endowment Effect 
–	 Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and 
the Coase Theorem,” The Journal of Political Economy, 1990 
•	 Dynamic Inconsistency and Commitment Mechanisms 
–	 ∗Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, p. 40-52 
–	 Laibson, “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” QJE, 2001. 
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–	 ∗Ariely & Wertenbroch, “Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance,” Psycholog­
ical Science, 2002 
•	 The Hot-Hand and Gambler’s Fallacies 
–	 ∗Tversky and Gilovich, “The Cold Facts about the ‘Hot Hand’ in Basketball,” 
Chance, 1989 
–	 Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, “The Hot Hand in Basketball,” Cognitive Psychol­
ogy, 1985 
–	 Avugos et al., “The ‘Hot Hand’ Reconsidered: A Meta-Analytic Approach,” Psychol­
ogy of Sports and Exercise, 2013 
–	 ∗Guryan and Kearney, “Gambling at Lucky Stores,” The American Economic Re­
view, 2008 
Part V: Neuroeconomics 
•	 Fehr & Rangel, “Neuroeconomic Foundations of Economic Choice—Recent Advances,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2011 
•	 ∗Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, “How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics,” Journal 
of Economic Literature, 2005 
•	 Koenigs & Tranel, “Irrational Economic Decision-Making After Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Damage: Evidence from the Ultimatum Game,” Journal of Neuroscience, 2007. 
•	 ∗Kuhnen & Knutson, “The Neural Basis of Financial Risk Taking,” Neuron, 2005. 
•	 Sanfrey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, “The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-
Making in the Ultimatum Game,” Science, 2003. 
•	 ∗Tom, Sabrina M., Craig R. Fox, Christopher Trepel, and Russell A. Poldrack, 
The Neural Basis of Loss Aversion in Decision-Making under Risk, Science, January 2007, 
315 (5811), 515518. 
Part VI: Field Experiments 
•	 Harrison and List, “Field Experiments”, Journal of Economic Literature, 2004, p. 1009­
1016 
•	 List, “Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? 
Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards,” The American Economic Review, 2001 
7
 
Students who successfully complete this course will: 
1. Understand experimental design 
2. Understand why economists use economics experiments 
3. Be aware of Institutional Review Board requirements for conducting experiments using 
human subjects 
4. Be familiar with some of the common tools and tasks that experimental economists use 
to conduct experiments, such as, the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the beauty 
contests, and instruments to measure risk and competitive preferences 
5. Be familiar with some important empirical regularities found in economics experiments, 
for example: risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, loss aversion, and unstable preferences. 
6. Be able to effectively critique an economics experiment 
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